Las bases neuronales de la racionalidad limitada by Coricelli, Giorgio & Nagel, Rosemarie
The neural basis of bounded raTional behavior
Las bases neuronaLes de La racionaLidad Limitada
GiorGio CoriCelli  giorgio.coricelli@usc.edu
University of Southern California. USA
rosemarie NaGel  rosemarie.nagel@upf.edu
Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Institució Catalana de Recerca L Estudis Avançats (ICREA). Barcelona 
Graduate School of Economics. Spain
abstraCt 
bounded rational behaviour is commonly observed in experimental games and in real life situations. neuroeco-
nomics can help to understand the mental processing underlying bounded rationality and out-of-equilibrium 
behaviour. Here we report results from recent studies on the neural basis of limited steps of reasoning in a 
competitive setting —the beauty contest game. We use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) to study 
the neural correlates of human mental processes in strategic games. We apply a cognitive hierarchy model to 
classify subject’s choices in the experimental game according to the degree of strategic reasoning so that we can 
identify the neural substrates of different levels of strategizing.  We found a correlation between levels of strategic 
reasoning and activity in a neural network related to mentalizing, i.e. the ability to think about other’s thoughts 
and mental states. moreover, brain data showed how complex cognitive processes subserve the higher level 
of reasoning about others. We describe how a cognitive hierarchy model fits both behavioural and brain data. 
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resumeN
La racionalidad limitada es un fenómeno observado de manera frecuente tanto en juegos experimentales como 
en situaciones cotidianas. La neuroeconomía puede mejorar la comprensión de los procesos mentales que 
caracterizan la racionalidad limitada; en paralelo nos puede ayudar a comprender comportamientos que violan el 
equilibrio. nuestro trabajo presenta resultados recientes sobre la bases neuronales del razonamiento estratégico 
(y sus límite) en juegos competitivos —como el juego del “beauty contest”. estudiamos las bases neuronales 
del comportamiento estratégico en juegos con interacción entre sujetos usando resonancia magnética funcional 
(fMRI). Las decisiones de los participantes se clasifican acorde al grado de razonamiento estratégico: el llamado 
modelo de Jerarquías cognitivas. Los resultados muestran una correlación entre niveles de razonamiento y acti-
vidad neuronal relacionada con el “mentalizing”, es decir, con la habilidad para pensar y atribuir pensamientos 
y estados mentales a otros individuos. más aun, la actividad cerebral nos muestra que los procesos cognitivos 
complejos aparecen en los niveles superiores de razonamiento estratégico. Finalmente, nuestro trabajo eviden-
cia que el modelo de Jerarquías cognitivas describen bien el comportamiento y la actividad cerebral. 
Palabras Clave
beauty contest game; Jerarquía cognitiva; neuroeconomía; resonancia magnética funcional (fmri).
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iNtroduCtioN
economists only recently departed from the rational man and the notion of common 
knowledge of rationality when theorizing on economic problems. common knowledge of 
rationality means that a decision maker knows that he is rational, that he knows that the 
other decision makers are rational and that he knows that others also know that every-
body is rational, and so on. a rational agent maximizes his expected utility, which means 
that a utility of different results are weighted by their objective or subjective probabilities 
and maximized. experimental economists have provided in the last two decades experi-
mental results showing how far humans comply with or deviate from these assumptions, 
thus corroborating theories of bounded rationality.
 Here we use a neuroeconomics approach, combining economics and neuroscience, 
to study bounded rational behaviour determined by limited depth of reasoning on players’ 
beliefs about one another in a competitive interactive setting —the beauty contest game. 
The game was inspired by a quote from Keynes (1936):
 Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions [the beauty 
contest] in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hun-
dred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly 
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each 
competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which 
he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking 
at the problem from the same point of view. it is not a case of choosing those which, to 
the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opin-
ion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote 
our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to 
be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. 
(Keynes, 1936).
 Keynes describes different ways of thinking about others in a competitive environ-
ment. this can range from low levels reasoning, characterized by self referential thinking 
(choosing what you like without considering others’ behaviour), to higher levels of rea-
soning, taking into account the thinking of others about others (“third degree”), and so 
on. note, however, that Keynes advises not to use either level 0 or level 1 (“It is not a 
case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor 
even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.”). However, he does not 
make a clear proposal what other level to choose.  
 many features of social and competitive interaction require this kind of reasoning; for 
example, deciding when to queue for precious theatre tickets or when to sell or buy in the 
stock market, before too many others do it. 
 Why do people use different and limited numbers of steps of reasoning? as the number 
of steps of thinking increases, the decision rule requires more computation. a player’s ten-
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dency to believe that others will not use as many steps of thinking as he does might be due 
to cognitive limitations or individual characteristics, such as overconfidence (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999). a higher level of reasoning indicates more strategic behaviour paired with 
the belief that the other players are also more strategic (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004). 
 Identifying the neural correlates of different levels of reasoning, and more specifically, 
being able to distinguish between low- versus high-level reasoning people according to their 
brain activity will help to explain the heterogeneity observed in human strategic behaviour. 
the exPerimeNtal beauty CoNtest Game
nagel (1995) studies an experimental competitive game, analogous to the Keynes’s 
beauty contest, to characterise different levels of strategic reasoning. in the experimen-
tal game, participants choose a number between 0 and 100. the winner is the person 
whose number is closest to 2/3 times the average of all chosen numbers. this game is 
suitable for investigating whether and how a player’s mental process incorporates the 
behaviour of the other players in his strategic reasoning. Game theory suggests a pro-
cess of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies which in infinite steps reaches 
the unique nash-equilibrium in which everybody chooses 0. 
 However, “the natural way of looking at game situations is not based on circular 
concepts [as for the nash equilibrium] but rather on a step by step reasoning procedure” 
(Selten, 1998:421) which typically results in out-of-equilibrium behaviour. 
The cognitive hierarchy model
This step reasoning can be some finite steps of the iterated elimination process or of the so-
called iterated best reply, a cognitive Hierarchy of thinking, that better describes behaviour 
in the beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1995; Camerer et al., 2004). For 
instance, a naïve player (level 0) chooses randomly. a level 1 player thinks of others as level 
0 reasoning and chooses 33 (= 2/3*50), where 50 is the average of randomly chosen num-
bers from 0 to 100. a more sophisticated player (level 2) supposes that everybody thinks 
like a level 1 player and therefore he chooses 22 (= (2/3)2 *50). and, as Keynes mentioned 
there might eventually be people reaching the (nash) equilibrium of the game, and thereby 
choosing 0. according to the cognitive Hierarchy model a subject is strategic of degree 
k if he chooses the number 50*mk, called iteration step k. choices in many beauty con-
test experimental games (Nagel, 1995; Ho, Camerer & Weigelt, 1998; Bosch-Domenech, 
Montalvo, Nagel, & Satorra, 2002; Costa-Gomes & Crawford, 2006) show limited steps of 
reasoning, a bounded rational behaviour, confirming the relevance of the iterated best-reply 
model. The Cognitive Hierarchy model: (1) is not an equilibrium model, i.e. strategies of pla-
yers don’t have to be best reply to each other; (2) it does not assume common knowledge 
of rationality; (3) it assumes that players best reply to own beliefs, such beliefs might be non 
consistent; (4) it is based on limited level of reasoning of oneself or others. 
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aN fmri study oN levels of strateGiC reasoNiNG
In Coricelli and Nagel (Coricelli & Nagel, 2009) we used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fmri) to measure brain activity when subjects participated in the beauty contest 
game. We introduced two main conditions in an event-related fashion. in the human con-
dition, each participant of a group of 10 was asked to choose an integer between 0 and 
100. the winner is the person whose number is closest to the target number (a parameter 
multiplier (e.g., 2/3) times the average of the 10 chosen numbers within the group). in the 
computer condition one participant chose one number and a computer algorithm chose 
randomly (and independently of the multiplier parameter) nine numbers. this algorithm 
was known to the subjects. the prize for the winner was 10 euros in each trial of both 
conditions, or a split of the prize in case of ties. the computer condition should invoke low 
levels of reasoning (at or near level 1) according to the iterative reply model. in contrast, 
in the human condition a higher variety of levels of reasoning should be observed since 
players might have different ideas what other players choose. to be able to identify brain 
activity related to mental calculation most likely involved when deciding in the game, we 
introduced calculation tasks in which subjects were asked to multiply a given parameter 
(e.g. 2/3*66) (c1 condition) or the square of a parameter (e.g., 2/3*2/3*66) (c2 condition) 
with a given integer. 
bounded rational behaviour: participants played according to the cognitive 
hierarchy model
as found in previous experimental economics studies of the game (e.g. nagel, 1995; 
Stahl & Wilson, 1995; Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002; Camerer et al., 2004, Costa-Gomes 
& Crawford, 2006), in (Coricelli & Nagel, 2009) the behavioural results confirmed the 
presence of play according to the iterated best reply model. the starting point for the 
reasoning process was 50 and not 100, and the process was driven by ‘finite’ iterative 
best replies and not by elimination of dominated strategies. in the computer condition, 
all subjects chose numbers close to level 1 (50*m, were m is the multiplier parameter). 
We categorized each player according to three categories: random behaviour, level 1, 
and level 2 or higher reasoning. We measured the level of reasoning of a subject as 
the smallest quadratic distance between actual play and the different theoretical values 
based on the cognitive Hierarchy model in the human condition. the high-level rea-
soning subjects (n=7) clearly differentiated their behaviour in the human compared to 
the computer condition. they behaved as level 1 in the computer condition but were 
classified as higher level of reasoning (level 2 or more) when interacting with human 
counterparts. The subjects classified as low level (N=10) behaved similarly against the 
computer or the humans: at or close to level 1 in both conditions. Three subjects behaved 
in a quite random fashion.
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neural correlates of depth of reasoning
in our fmri study we found enhanced brain activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFc), 
rostral anterior cingulate (acc), superior temporal sulcus (sts) and bilateral temporo-
parietal junction (tPJ) when subjects made choices facing human opponents rather than 
a computer. The foci of activity in the mPFC (peak MNI coordinates, x = 0, y = 48, z = 
24) are consistent with results of many studies on theory of mind or mentalizing (see 
Figure 1); (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; mccabe, Houser, ryan, smith 
& Trouard, 2001; Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith & Husain, 2004; Amodio & Frith, 2006). Psy-
chologists and philosophers define as theory of mind or mentalizing, the ability to think 
about others’ thoughts and mental states in order to predict their intentions and actions. 
Figure 1 
Brain areas and activity 
each dot in this template (human brain) represents a focus of activity related to different functions (e.g. action 
monitoring, self-knoledge, etc.) found in independent neuroimaging studies. activity related to mentalizing 
is found in the medial prefrontal cortex (brodmann areas ba10 and ba32, also called paracinglulate). this 
activity is found when contrasting mentalizing vs. non mentalizing tasks, thus when the participants are asked 
to ascribe and attribute mental states and beliefs to others to interpret and understand their behavior vs. tasks 
in which the understanding of the context does not require any attribution of mental states. When the task 
is an experimental game, the contrast often used to isolate mentalizing activity is human-human vs. human-
computer interaction (Coricelli, McCabe and Smith 2000; McCabe et al 2001). The figure is reproduced from 
amodio and Frith (2006), with permission.
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 When we analyzed separately the high- and the low-level reasoning subjects, we 
found the activity in the medial prefrontal cortex to be stronger in subjects classified as 
high level (Figure 2). in the high reasoners, guessing a number in the human condition 
activated two main regions of the medial prefrontal cortex, a more dorsal and a more 
ventral portion of the anterior mPFc. 
 the prefrontal activity of the low-level reasoning subjects was found in the rostral 
anterior cingulate cortex (Figure 2) (see section 3.4 below for an interpretation of the 
data). 
 fmri results show additional brain activities related to high- versus low-level reaso-
ning in the right and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex and left and right dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex, areas likely related to performance monitoring and cognitive control (Koechlin 
& Summerfield, 2007). This suggests that a complex cognitive process subserves the 
higher level of reasoning about others. 
 the beauty contest game also requires solving a complex calculation task. thus, in 
order to follow a first or higher level of reasoning, the subjects need to mentally multiply 
what they think might be the average of the numbers guessed by the others, including 
into this average their own number, and then multiplying the result by the announced 
factor, one or more times. bilateral activity in the parietal cortex, encompassing the angu-
lar gyrus, the inferior parietal lobule, and the supramarginal gyrus, was found both in 
the human and computer conditions. results from our calculation task show enhanced 
Figure 2 
Distinct brain areas for high and low level of reasoning 
Pattern of neural activity related to low and high level of reasoning in the beauty contest game. Guessing in 
the human condition in contrast to the computer condition was associated with relative enhanced activity in 
the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Left panel, low level of reasoning subjects, acc); and (Right panel, high 
level of reasoning subjects) activity in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (mPFc) and ventral medial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFc). this shows how the neural activity of low and high level of reasoning people differs.
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activity in the angular gyrus  and in the inferior parietal lobule when the subjects were 
requested to mentally multiply a factor times a number (c1 condition), and greater acti-
vity in the same areas when they were asked to multiply twice the same factor times 
a number (c2 condition). suggesting that part of the calculation activity related to the 
beauty contest game might be performed by these portions of the parietal cortex. addi-
tional activity related to calculation (both c1 and c2 conditions) was found in the lateral 
prefrontal cortex. notably, no activity of the medial prefrontal cortex was related with any 
kind of calculation. 
The medial prefrontal cortex correlates with strategic iQ
In Coricelli & Nagel (2009) we found a cross-subject correlation between a measure of 
strategic iQ in the beauty contest (computed as the distance of own choice to the target 
number, m*average of all chosen numbers, across all trials) and brain activity in the 
mPFC. Strategic IQ is reflected by the ability of subjects to match the right guess using 
higher levels of reasoning, that is, the ability to think deeply about others. strategic iQ 
was not correlated with accuracy (number of exact responses) in the calculation task, 
thus it is independent of cognitive or calculation skills. notably, no other brain region of 
interest was correlated with strategic iQ. this suggests that the mPFc, involved in higher 
reasoning about others, leads to successful outcomes in our interactive setting.
dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal activity: self-other distinction
as described above (Figure 2), we found two portions of the medial prefrontal cortex, a 
more dorsal and a more ventral one, which are activated in human vs. computer condi-
tion for high level or reasoning only. the foci of activity in the medial prefrontal cortex are 
consistent with results of many studies on mentalizing (Fletcher et al., 1995; Bird, 2004; 
Gallagher et al., 2000; mccabe, et al., 2001). the underlying processing of high level 
of reasoning in the guessing game implies thinking about other thinking of you thinking 
about them, and so on; this implies that the higher level of reasoning subjects considered 
the others potentially ‘like them’. in other words they assume that the same reasoning 
that they are performing is likely performed by others, thus inducing a process of iterative 
thinking towards higher levels of resoning. this process implies that they deeply think 
about others in a ‘like me’ fashion. as shown in previous neuroimaging studies (mitchell, 
Banaji & Macrae, 2005; Mitchell, Macrae & Banaji, 2006), judging if others are similar to 
self activates the ventral anterior medial PFc. moreover, third person perspective (put 
yourself in the shoes of the other) in making judgement about self mediates activity in the 
medial prefrontal cortex (d’argenmbreu et al., 2007). our results suggest that those two 
mental processing characterized higher level of reasoning in our experimental guessing 
game. thus, deep strategic thinking implies both considering the others as like minded, 
and taking a third person perspective of our own behaviour. the main prefrontal activity 
of the low level of reasoning subjects was found in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, an 
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area often attributed to self-referential thinking in social cognitive tasks (moran, macrae, 
Heatherton, Wyland & Kelley,  2006). Thinking about the others as random players, thus 
considering them as “zero-intelligent” agents needs only a first person perspective of the 
interactive context. 
Pattern of neural activity related with recursive thinking
fmri results show additional brain activities related to high versus low level of reasoning 
in the right and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex and bilateral BA44. The involvement of 
those areas suggests that higher level of reasoning requires the use of a complex cogni-
tive apparatus. Lateral orbitofrontal cortex (BA 47) is often related with switching in cog-
nitive states, which in our experimental task might refer to switching from thinking about 
self and other thinking about you, and so on. BA 44 might be related with the sequencing 
component of recursive thinking needed in higher level of reasoning. 
theory of miNd (meNtaliziNG) aNd strateGiziNG
We hypothesize that strategizing relies heavily on a theory-of-mind mechanism (tomm) or 
mentalizing. thinking of other’s mind is a normal ability of our species that has evolved over 
time as a result of social (interpersonal) interactions. Whether or not a theory of mind is an 
exclusive human ability is still an open question. (See: Baron-Cohen ,1995; Woodruff and 
Premack, 1979; Gallup, 1970; Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993; Povinelli, 1993).
 in coricelli and nagel (2009) we design an experiment to test whether or not a theory 
of mind mechanism is activated during strategic interactions and if this mechanism is 
related with depth of strategic reasoning. in the psychological and philosophical literature 
there are two main theories about theory of mind or mentalizing. the so-called “theory-
Theory” approach assumes that we use a simplified theory of human behavior when we 
attribute mental states or beliefs to others in order to predict their actions. according to 
the second approach, called simulation theory, people predict and interpret the behavior 
of others by imagining being in their situation (in terms of their mental state). individuals 
“put themselves in the other’s shoes,” (Gordon, 1995). simulation theory states that we 
predict and explain the behavior of other individuals by a simulative process, i.e. we 
simulate the decision-making process of the other individual by using part of our cognitive 
systems (Goldman, 1995; Gordon, 1995).
the simulation approach postulates that the heuristics or material employed in mentali-
zing make essential use of the attributer’s own psychology. in the standard lore of simu-
lation theory, an attributer who wishes to predict a target’s decision begins by creating 
pretend states in himself that correspond (or so he thinks) to prior states of the target. 
He feels these pretend states into his own decision-making mechanism, and sees what 
decision the mechanism outputs (Goldman, 2001:2).
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according to simulation theory we simulate the mental states of the other individuals 
using our own decision-making mechanism. This process is domain specific, considering 
that our decision-making mechanisms are different and specialized for different contexts. 
Degrees of knowledge of the others and the context (Coricelli, McCabe & Smith, 2000), 
ranging from certainty to uncertainty; and the different levels of recursive reasoning 
(depths of reasoning), are crucial factors in the definition of the brain circuits that are 
needed to solve the interactive situation. this approach is in contrast with the existence 
of a single theory-of-mind module, and calls for future studies aimed at understanding the 
underlying complexity of the mechanisms that drive social interaction.
 in our experiment we could distinguish two behavioral types in terms of their levels 
of reasoning. Low level of reasoning subjects played in the same way with human or 
computer opponents, indeed they played level 1 in both conditions. they best respond to 
their beliefs that others (either humans or computer) would play randomly. thus, low level 
of reasoning subjects used a simplified model of others’ behavior (Figure 3).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subjects classified as low level behaved similarly against the computer or the humans, thus they behaved 
as level 1 in both conditions (Left). the high level of reasoning subjects clearly differentiated their behaviour 
in the human compared to the computer condition (right). they behaved as level 1 in the computer condition 
while being classified as higher level of reasoning (level 2 or more) when interacting with human counterparts. 
Low level of reasoning implies a best reply to the belief that others will play Level 0 (i.e. will play randomly); 
while, high level of reasoning implies a best reply to the belief that others will play at Level 1 (or higher), this 
means that high level of reasoning subjects will use their own decision making procedure (i.e. best reply) to 
compute the beliefs about the behaviour of the others.
Figure 3 
Choices of high and low of reasoning for M=2/3, against the computer or human players 
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 in contrast high level of reasoning subjects best responded to the beliefs that the 
others would play at level 1 (or higher). This implies that in defining their beliefs about 
others’ behavior they used their own decision-making procedure (best response). they 
indeed assume that also other players best respond to their beliefs about other players’ 
behavior (Figure 3). This suggests that low level might have a simplified model of others’ 
behaviour which can be interpreted that they have no model of other players’ thinking 
process or they use a simplified statistical model as if they were playing against nature, 
while high level of reasoning might simulate the behavior of others with their own decision 
making procedure. this interpretation of the possible mental processes underlying the 
observed behavior in our experiment fits quite well the observed pattern of brain activity 
related to the low and high level of reasoning subjects (i.e., the activity of brain structure 
related to complex cognitive functions during high strategic reasoning).
learNiNG aNd strateGiC reasoNiNG
Notably, the focus of activity in the mPFC (peak MNI coordinates, x = 0, y = 48, z = 24; 
related to higher level of reasoning in our game) coincides with the focus of activity rela-
ted to degree of thinking about how own behaviour can influence others’ behaviour, as 
reported in a recent study (Figure 4) (Hampton et al., 2008). 
Figure 4 
The importance of mPFC activity for high level of reasoning and “influence” reasoning
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. in the study by Hampton et al. the activity in the mPFc is found when contrasting two dynamic models of choice 
in a repeated competitive game. one based on updating own strategy based on other’s past choices, giving 
best response to the frequency play of actual behaviour (Fictive). a second, more sophisticated type, assumes 
that subjects considered the effect of their own past choices on other’s behaviour (Influence). Activity (betas) 
in the mPFC correlates with the (across subjects) difference of the likelihoods between Influence and Fictive. 
b. the same mPFc activity is found in coricelli and nagel 2009 for high reasoners in the beauty contest game. 
adapted from Hampton et al. (2006).
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 in the study by Hampton et al. the activity in the mPFc is found when contrasting two 
dynamic models of choice in a repeated competitive game. one based on updating own 
strategy based on other’s past choices (Fictive), giving best response to the frequency 
play of actual behaviour, is essentially our level 1 thinking. a second, more sophisticated 
type, assumes that subjects considered the effect of their own past choices on other’s 
behaviour (Influence). The contrast therefore is analogous to the difference in the beauty 
contest game between level 2 (or higher) and level 1 of strategic reasoning. 
 thus, the mPFc encoding the effect of our choices on others’ thought and behaviour 
is the neural signature of high level of strategic reasoning (level 2 or more). the main 
difference between these two studies are that in Hampton et al. subjects observed others’ 
behaviour over time and need to respond to it, while in our study the subjects need to 
model also the choices of the others. the brain does not seem to distinguish between 
these two data sources.  taken together, the results of these two studies represent the 
first close link between adaptive learning and levels of reasoning.
how NeurosCieNCe CaN iNform eCoNomiCs: sPeCifiCatioNs of the uNderlyiNG Pro-
CessiNG of humaN’s out-of-equilibrium behaviour
in the experimental beauty contest game, levels of reasoning were not induced (unlike 
the tasks used by (Bhatt & Camerer, 2005; D’Argembeau et al., 2007)), and we could 
detect heterogeneity between subjects based on their own choice of depth of reasoning. 
The main finding of the study by Coricelli and Nagel (2009) is that the mPFC clearly 
distinguishes high- versus low-level of strategic reasoning, thus encoding the complexity 
underlying human interactive situations. 
 the pattern of brain activity in the right and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex and in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex suggests a substantial jump in complexity when going from 
first to second level of reasoning. This might be responsible for the observed limited 
step-level reasoning, either because subjects are not able to make this jump or because 
they believe that not everybody else is able to make this jump. this result provides a new 
interpretation that should be implemented in game theoretical modelling. this important 
difference has never been discussed in the experimental economics literature on stra-
tegic reasoning. instead, the main difference has been thought to be between random 
behaviour and higher level; mainly because level 1 contains already best reply struc-
ture, a fundamental concept in economic theory. However data from coricelli and nagel 
(2009) show that the main discontinuity is in the belief about other’s behaviour as naïve 
or random behaviour (the underlying belief of level 1 players) vs. belief of best reply 
behaviour (level 2 or higher). 
 rational game theory only predicts equilibrium play, supposing common knowledge 
of rationality —everybody is rational and thinks that everybody else is rational, and so on. 
However actual behaviour deviates from equilibrium. in fact, humans use bounded ratio-
nal strategies or cognitive hierarchies to mimic optimal behaviour. thus, people behave 
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differently based on different beliefs about others’ behaviour. the results of our study 
demonstrate that much of the variation in strategic behaviour lies in individuals’ different 
attitudes towards others. crucially, behaviour that was based on more self-referential 
thinking (“i believe that others just play randomly”) resulted in a larger deviation from 
rationality. thus, people who are socially and strategically more intelligent are likely to 
reason in a less self-referential way i.e. they incorporate that others are also reasoning.
This paper should be seen as a contribution to McCabe’s statement: 
Herbert simon’s research on bounded rationality (simon, 1957) implies that strategies 
are likely to be encoded in the brain as a mapping from partitions of circumstances into 
partitions of actions together with inferential (Holland, Holyoak & Nisbett, 1986) and rea-
soning mechanisms (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) that modify and scale these partitions. 
to understand how such encodings and mechanisms are formed requires both a top 
down approach using experimental methods [experimental beauty contest] and strate-
gic models from economics [cognitive hierarchy model] and a bottom up approach using 
experimental methods [fmri  beauty contest] and computational models from cognitive 
neuroscience. (McCabe 2008:345-368) 
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